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CASES NOTED
A recent bill,' intended to give taxpayers an outlet for avoiding this double
tax, 17 died when the Senate of the Eightieth Congress failed to pass it lefore
adjournment. It is indeed possible that the instant decision and its many recent
counterparts may force Congress to act soon with a similarly designed bill.
MONOPOLY-DIVESTITURE AS REMEDY
FOR VERTICAL INTEGRATION OF MOTION PICTURE COMPANIES
An anti-trust action under the Sherman Act ' was instituted in 1938
against the eight leading motion )icture companies and their subsidiaries.2 The
complaint alleged that these companies, through their integration of produc-
tion, distribution and exhibition of motion pictures, had conspired in restraint
of trade and had formed a concerted monopoly, discriminatory in nature. The
Government sought divestiture 3 and other equitable relief against further
violation of the Sherman Act and injunctive relief against specific unfair and
discriminatory practices. 4 The lower court's opinion 5 was that a system of
competitive bidding by exhibitors, separately for each picture and theatre,
would eliminate block-booking 0 and blind selling 7 and render divorcement
unnecessary. Upon appeal by both sides the Supreme Court remanded the case
for a determination of the effect of vertical integration in the industry and
16. H.R, 6712, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 129 (1948) (proposed Revenue Revision Act
of 1948).
17. H.R. REP. No. 2087, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 15 (1948): 1 RAKITN AND JOHNSON.
FEDE, AL INCOME Gi' AN) EsTATE. TAXATION 1318 (1947 ed.) ; Freeland, supra note 13.
1. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1946).
2. The defendants were: Paramount Pictures, Inc.; Paramount Film Distributing
Corp.; Loew's, Inc.: Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp.; RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.; Kcith-
Albee-Orpheun Corp.; RKO Proctor Corp.; RKO Midwest Corp.; Warner Bros.
Pictures. Inc.; Vitagraph, Inc.; Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp.; Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp.; National Theatres Corp.; Columbia Pictures Corp.; Co-
lumbia Pictures of La., Inc.; Universal Corp.; Universal Film Exchanges, Inc.; Big
U Film Exchange, Inc.; and United Artists Corp.
3. Divestiture and dissolution are commonly used remedies for anti-trust violations.
While there is some distinction between the two there is no definite rule of application.
The courts apparently use that remedy which they deem most appropriate. Generally,
divestiture is forcing a corporation to sell or otherwise dispose of some portion of its
holdings. Dissolution consists of splitting the entire corporation into its component
parts.
4. Five of the major companies (Paramount Pictures, Inc.; Loew's, Inc.; Radio-
Keith-Orpheum Corp.; Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.; and Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp.) entered into a temporary consent decree with the Government in 1940 under the
terms of which a status quo was maintained for three years and an arbitration system was
established. Although the consent decree lapsed before the issuance of the District
Court's opinion in 1946 the "majors" continued to comply with its provisions.
5. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). See
also United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
6. "Block-booking is the practice of licensing, or offering for license, one feature
or group of features on condition that the exhibitor will also license another feature or
group of features released by the distributors during a given period." United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156 (1948).
7. "Blind-selling is a practice whereby a distributor licenses a feature before the
exhibitor is afforded an opportunity to view it." United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 157 n.I1 (1948).
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for reconsideration of the potentially applicable remedial measures.8 Held,
that the industry's vertical integration, together with other practiced abuses,
required divorcement of the defendants' exhibition business from that of
production and distribution. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85
F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
Federal anti-trust acts vest in the Government the right to bring suit to
dissolve an unlawful combination.' Courts may decree dissolution of such
combinations; 10 but whether they do so rests largely in the court's discretion 1 I
in view of the particular facts of the case. 2 An important consideration is
whether the public interest will best be served by breaking up the unlawful
combination and, if not, the courts will generally refuse the Government's
request for this extreme measure.13 Dissolution is a remedy and not a penalty,'-,
and the less severe remedy of injunction is preferable where it will be ade-
quate. 15 But injunctive relief is usually inadequate where an illegal combina-
tion has persistently interfered with the free flow of commerce.1 The inade-
quacy of injunctions and propriety of divestiture has been recognized in
Sherman Act cases against the motion picture industry.'7
The major question in the instant case was not the guilt or innocence of
the defendant companies in violating the Sherman Act, but the finding of a
suitable remedy to prevent future violations. Exhibitor defendants had acquired
over a period of years "distinct ... spheres of control" 18 and, in so doing, a
relationship grew up in which there was a decided absence of competition. t"
Where there has been a tendency to use an affiliation for an unlawful purpose
the courts must be assured that there will be no future opportunity to do so
8. 334 U,S. 131 (1948).
9. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
10. E.g., Hartford Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945) ; United States
v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944); United States v. Reading Co., 253
U.S. 26 (1920) ; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
11. United States v. American Can Co., 234 Fed. 1019 (Md. 1916), appeal dis-
missed, 256 U.S. 706 (1921).
12. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); United States
v. Union Pacific R.R., 226 U.S. 61 (1912), 226 U.S. 470 (1913).
13. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) ; United States
v. Borax Consol., 62 F. Supp. 220 (N.D. Cal. 1945) ; United States v. American Can
Co., 234 Fed. 1019 (Md. 1916), appeal dismissed, 256 U.S. 706 (1921).
14. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945)
United States v. Borax Consol., 62 F. Supp. 220 (N.D. Cal. 1945).
15. United States v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 217 Fed. 656 (ND. Ohio 1914),
appeal dismissed, 245 U.S. 675 (1917).
16, United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964 (S.D,N.Y. 1916),
appeal dismissed. 249 U.S. 621 (1919).
17. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944).
18. Bertrand, Evans and Blanehard, The Motion Picture Industry-A Pattern of
Control 15 (TNEC Monograph 43. 1941). See Brady, The Problem of Monopoly, 254
THE. ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENcF. 125 (Nov.
1947).
19. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881, 892 (S.D.N.Y.
1949). See Brady, op. cit. supra note 18, at 131 (" . . the American movie industry is a
small coterie of vertically integrated, horizontally co-ordinated, and monopolistically in-
clined corporations. . . . The members of the group 'compete' with one another in some-
what the same way as do the several branches of the General Motors Corporation").
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again. 20 Here, divestiture was found to be necessary, rather than to intrust an
already monopolistic industry with the management of a competitive bidding
system or burden the court with its detailed and extensive supervision. 2'
The success of the Government in the recent maze of anti-trust actions
gives rise to a belief, that the next decade will witness a tremendous growth
of this type of litigation.2 2 The Paramount cases should and will form an im-
portant basis for future actions against allied industries such as radio, tele-
vision, professional athletics, and other entertainment fields. These industries
are inherently monopolistic because they are based on the development of
individual talent to a point at which it becomes irreplaceable. Should divestiture
prove successful as a remedy against the motion picture industry there may
be a more extensive use of this remedy in dealing with other anti-trust viola-
tions in the entertainment industries.
PROCEDURE-COUNTERCLAIM COMPULSORY IN REPRESENTATIVE
SUIT ALTHOUGH CLAIM AGAINST PLAINTIFF REPRESENTATIVE
IS PERSONAL IN NATURE
Plaintiff, employer of the deceased, brought a wrongful death action
against the defendant as assignee of the decedent's widow. The action was
brought in a representative capacity under the Florida Workmen's Compen-
sation Act which permits a widow to assign her right of action for her
husband's wrongful death.' From a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant,
who had failed to counterclaim in the initial suit, brought a separate action
against the employer as such for damages. The employer's motion to dismiss
was sustained on the ground that the issues had been fully adjudicated in
the former action. On appeal from the order dismissing the action, held;
order affirined, since the Florida statute2 requires the defendant to file
counterclaim in the original action for any damages sustained from the
same transaction. Newton v. Mitchell, 42 So.2d 53 (Florida 1949).
The defendant, upon appeal, contended that the statute requiring one to
counterclaim for damages arising out of the occurrence sued upon in the
initial suit should only apply to defeat his action had he subsequently sued
the plaintiff in the latter capacity as the assignee of the widow's right, that
20. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944).
21. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 163 (1948) ; United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
22. The baseball industry has already been attacked by private individuals for vio-
lations of the anti-trust laws. Martin v. Chandler, 85 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1949);
Gardella v. Chandler, 79 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). It is not inconceivable that
the government may also take some interest in the competitive conditions in that
industry.
1. FLA. STAT. § 440.39 (1941).
2. FLA. STAT. § 52.11 (1941).
